Security headers — strict CSP via _headers + dual CI audit

Strict CSP/HSTS/Permissions-Policy via CF _headers from oriz-kit

Security headers — strict CSP via _headers + dual CI audit

Decision

Every family site ships a strict security-headers preset via a _headers file at the project root, sourced from @chirag127/oriz-kit. Cloudflare Pages reads the file at deploy and applies the rules at the edge.

Every PR runs two auditors in parallel:

1. securityheaders.com — Scott Helme’s rubric (headers grade)
2. Mozilla Observatory — TLS + cookies + redirects + headers (comprehensive)

PR fails if either score drops below A.

Why

• Default-deny is the only safe stance. A strict CSP without unsafe-eval or wildcard origins is the single most effective XSS mitigation; it has to ship by default, not as an opt-in per site.
• Config-as-code via _headers — auditable in git, no Cloudflare UI clicks, ships in the kit. Every site copies the preset; per-site additions allowed but never weakening.
• Dual audit catches drift. securityheaders.com grades headers alone; Mozilla Observatory adds TLS + cookies + redirect chains. Either alone leaves a category unchecked.
• Both are free, no card. Aligns with no-card-on-file.
• Layered with the code-quality stack — same philosophy: defensive layering, fail loud, no silent drift.

The locked preset

The kit’s _headers template:

/*
  Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval' https://challenges.cloudflare.com; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: https://*.imagekit.io https://*.cloudinary.com; connect-src 'self' https://api.oriz.in https://*.firebaseio.com https://firestore.googleapis.com https://*.knock.app https://vitals.vercel-insights.com; frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self'
  Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload
  X-Frame-Options: DENY
  X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
  Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
  Permissions-Policy: accelerometer=(), camera=(), geolocation=(), gyroscope=(), magnetometer=(), microphone=(), payment=(self), usb=()
  Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin
  Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: same-site

connect-src includes the family’s known endpoints: api.oriz.in, Firestore, Knock, and Vercel Speed Insights. Per-site additions are allowed but must be reviewed.

Implications

Architecture

• @chirag127/oriz-kit ships the _headers preset under templates/_headers. Each site’s CI either copies the file or extends it via per-site _headers.append.
• The preset registers HSTS preload (max-age=63072000 = 2 years, includeSubDomains, preload) — oriz.in apex must be submitted to https://hstspreload.org/ once across the family (it covers all subdomains).
• Permissions-Policy whitelist is minimal: only payment=(self) for Razorpay flows. Camera / mic / geolocation / accelerometer are off everywhere — sites that need them flip the relevant directive in their per-site _headers.

CI gate

• Per-repo ci.yml adds two jobs after the Cloudflare Pages preview deploy:
  • security-headers-grade — calls securityheaders.com API, parses JSON for grade, fails if not A or A+.
  • mozilla-observatory — runs npx @mdn/mdn-http-observatory against the preview hostname, fails if score < 85.
• API key for securityheaders.com lives in Doppler and syncs to GitHub Actions; Mozilla Observatory CLI needs no key.

What “below A” means

• securityheaders.com grade = A or A+ ? pass; any other grade fails.
• Mozilla Observatory score = 85 (= grade A) ? pass; below fails.
• Score drops — i.e. a PR is blocked only if it makes things worse. Pre-existing site state is the floor; PRs cannot weaken it. (Lifting all sites to A is a one-time push, not a per-PR blocker.)

What we don’t do

• No unsafe-eval anywhere in CSP. Sites that need eval-style patterns (e.g. live MDX preview) sandbox them in an iframe.
• No * wildcard origins in connect-src / img-src. Specific hosts only.
• No paid auditors — Hardenize, Probely, Detectify all paid.
• No Cloudflare Transform Rules UI — config-as-code via _headers is auditable; UI clicks drift silently.
• No HSTS rollback path — preload list removal takes weeks; a site that breaks HTTPS stays broken. The kit’s preset is reviewed before family-wide adoption.

Cross-refs

• Cloudflare _headers service entry
• securityheaders.com service entry
• Mozilla Observatory service entry
• security services index
• Cloudflare Pages — host that reads _headers
• Code-quality stack decision
• Per-repo CI workflows decision
• Multi-provider auth — App Check + reCAPTCHA also gate Firestore
• Doppler — secrets sync
• No card-on-file rule

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